Special Forces Unconventional Warfare
Training Circular No. 18-01, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 30 November 2010
Training Circular (TC) 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, defines the current United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces (SF) concept of planning and conducting unconventional warfare (UW) operations. For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will predominantly engage in irregular warfare (IW) operations.
TC 18-01 is authoritative but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude SF units from developing their own standing operating procedures (SOPs) to meet their needs. It explains planning and the roles of SF, Military Information Support operations (MISO), and Civil Affairs (CA) in UW operations. There are appropriate manuals within the series that addresses the other primary SF missions in detail.
The primary users of this manual are commanders, staff officers, and operational personnel at the team (Special Forces operational detachment A [SFODA]), company (Special Forces operational detachment B [SFODB]), and battalion (Special Forces operational detachment C [SFODC]) levels. This TC is specifically for SF Soldiers; however, it is also intended for use Army wide to improve the integration of SF into the plans and operations of other special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces.
Commanders and trainers should use this and other related manuals in conjunction with command guidance and the Combined Arms Training Strategy to plan and conduct successful UW operations. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of this TC is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SF, 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000. This TC is designed to be UNCLASSIFIED in order to ensure the widest distribution possible to the appropriate Army special operations forces (ARSOF) and other interested Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Government (USG) agencies while protecting technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
Chapter 1: Overview
There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest. President John F. Kennedy, 1962
The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), defines UW as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.
INTRODUCTION TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-1. The intent of U.S. UW efforts is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. Historically, the military concept for the employment of UW was primarily in support of resistance movements during general-war scenarios. While this concept remains valid, the operational environment since the end of World War II has increasingly required U.S. forces to conduct UW in scenarios short of general war (limited war).
1-2. Enabling a resistance movement or insurgency entails the development of an underground and guerrilla forces, as well as supporting auxiliaries for each of these elements. Resistance movements or insurgencies always have an underground element. The armed component of these groups is the guerrilla force and is only present if the resistance transitions to conflict. The combined effects of two interrelated lines of effort largely generate the end result of a UW campaign. The efforts are armed conflict and subversion. Forces conduct armed conflict, normally in the form of guerrilla warfare, against the security apparatus of the host nation (HN) or occupying military. Conflict also includes operations that attack and degrade enemy morale, organizational cohesion, and operational effectiveness and separate the enemy from the population. Over time, these attacks degrade the ability of the HN or occupying military to project military power and exert control over the population. Subversion undermines the power of the government or occupying element by portraying it as incapable of effective governance to the population.
1-3. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, recognizes that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. UW is inherently a USG interagency effort, with a scope that frequently exceeds the capabilities of the DOD alone. There are numerous, uniquely defined terms associated with UW (Figure 1-1, page 1-2).
These terms developed over the years from various military and government agencies, as well as the academic world. Many of the terms used to define UW appear to closely resemble one another and most are found in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, or JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.
1-4. The following chapters contain vital information for U.S. Forces. In addition, there are four appendixes. Appendix A provides an example of an area study, Appendix B gives an example of an SF area assessment, Appendix C contains a sample program of instruction for resistance forces, and Appendix D details SF caching.
THE ROLE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY
1-5. Three documents capture the U.S. national strategy: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. The National Security Strategy states the President’s interest and goals. The National Defense Strategy is the DOD contribution to the National Security Strategy. The National Defense Strategy also provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance, specifically for campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. The goals and objectives of the President’s National Security Strategy guide the National Military Strategy. In addition, the National Military Strategy implements the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy. The National Military Strategy provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives.
1-6. USG support to a resistance or insurgency can manifest in any of the following manners:
Indirect support. In limited-war scenarios, overt U.S. support for a resistance movement is sometimes undesirable. In these cases, the USG may indirectly render support though a coalition partner or a third-country location. The USG normally limits indirect support to logistical aid and training. Limited war presents a much more restrictive environment that requires low-profile execution of all USG support operations.
Direct support (less combat). In general-war scenarios, the visibility of USG support is less controversial, which expands the nature of possible USG support to include a wider scope of logistical support, training, and advisory assistance. U.S. assistance can include advisors in sanctuaries or insurgent-controlled areas not in direct combat. The United States can also render assistance from a neighboring country.
Combat support. Combat support includes all of the activities of indirect and direct support in addition to combat operations.
1-7. Before providing support to a resistance movement or insurgency, planners must consider how the ideology and objectives of the resistance movement affect strategic interests in the region. Planners must ensure leadership clearly defines U.S. national strategy and goals before planners make any determination regarding the appropriateness of support to a resistance movement or insurgency. Without a clear understanding of the desired effects and end state for a region or conflict, it is impossible to assess whether support to a resistance or insurgency would achieve favorable results.
1-8. Successful planners weigh the benefits of providing support to resistance forces against the overall strategic context of a campaign. They must not allow a desire to conduct UW or to produce a purely military effect dominate their judgment. Support to resistance forces does not simply contribute to a military effort; it undoubtedly alters the geopolitical landscape of a given region. Planners may deem a specific insurgent effort feasible and appropriate to the military effort, but consider it strategically unfavorable because of the political risk of the effort or the potential for increased regional instability.
FEASIBILITY FOR UNITED STATES SPONSORSHIP
1-9. There are certain environments and situations that make UW the best option. Although outside forces could alter and shape the existing environment to some degree, they cannot artificially manufacture or transplant it.
1-10. There are two categories planners use when deciding to provide support. The first category is feasibility. Feasibility is dependent upon the physical and human conditions of the environment. The second category is appropriateness. Appropriateness is dependent upon the characteristics of the resistance movement.
1-11. U.S. UW forces possess capabilities that can profoundly affect the human terrain through shaping operations that influence behavior in support of U.S. objectives. They can also influence resistance movement characteristics, making them more appropriate to the mission. For example, U.S. UW forces could emphasize guerrilla adherence to international norms and standards of behavior.
1-12. Planners further break down feasibility and appropriateness into the seven dynamics of an insurgency. Chapter 2 discusses these dynamics in detail.
PHYSICAL AND HUMAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
1-13. There are specific physical and environmental conditions that allow for a successful resistance or insurgency. The three main conditions are a weakened or unconsolidated government or occupying power, a segmented population, and favorable terrain from which an element can organize and wage subversion and armed resistance.
WEAKENED OR UNCONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT OR OCCUPYING POWER
1-14. Conditions must sufficiently divide or weaken the organizational mechanisms that the ruling regime uses to maintain control over the civilian population for the resistance to successfully organize the minimum core of clandestine activities. It is extremely difficult to organize successful resistance under a fully consolidated government or occupying power with a strong internal security apparatus. Despite the general dissatisfaction of the society, the resistance has little chance of developing the supporting infrastructure it needs to succeed. Planners need to recognize the significant differences in the ability of different elements to exert control over a population. A recent foreign occupier does not have the same ability as an indigenous long-standing dictatorial regime that has had years to consolidate power. Chapter 1
WILL OF THE POPULATION
1-15. The population must possess not only the desire to resist but also the will to bear the significant hardships associated with repressive countermeasures by the government or occupying power. Populations that the regime subjugates or indoctrinates for long periods are less likely to possess the will required to sustain a prolonged and difficult struggle. Populations living under repressive conditions generally either retain their unique religious, cultural, and ethnic identity or begin to assimilate with the regime out of an instinct to survive. Planners need to distinguish between the population’s moral opinion of their “oppressors” and their actual willingness to accept hardship and risk on behalf of their values and beliefs. Populations recently overtaken by an occupying military force have a very different character than those that have had to survive for decades under an oppressive regime.
1-16. Information activities that increase dissatisfaction with the hostile regime or occupier and portray the resistance as a viable alternative are important components of the resistance effort. These activities can increase support for the resistance through persuasive messages that generate sympathy among populations.
1-17. In almost every scenario, resistance movements face a population with an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction supporting the resistance movement (Figure 1-2).
For the resistance to succeed, it must convince the uncommitted middle population, which includes passive supporters of both sides, to accept it as a legitimate entity. A passive population is sometimes all a well-supported insurgency needs to seize political power. As the level of support for the insurgency increases, the passive majority will decrease.
1-18. In order to conduct operations, resistance forces require human and physical terrain that provides safe haven. This terrain must possess enough security for resistance members to train, organize, and recuperate. The resistance must locate safe havens in relatively inaccessible areas that restrict the ability of the HN military force to project power and exert control. Examples of favorable terrain include physically inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, jungles, and swamps, or artificial safe havens (such as urban ghettos or an international border). Artificial safe havens replicate actual restrictive terrain. However, artificial safe havens are only restrictive for as long as the risk of penetrating them remains unacceptable to HN forces. In contrast, safe havens in physically inaccessible terrain, such as mountains and jungles, remain restrictive to pursuing counterinsurgent forces.
1-19. An important aspect of the human terrain is the opportunity it presents for the resistance to access populations in enemy-controlled areas, to disseminate information about the resistance and its objectives, and to establish beneficial lines of communications (LOCs) with key communicators. Active cultivation of relationships with key communicators can lower barriers and increase cooperation between U.S. forces and the resistance movement.
1-20. Elements can sometimes negate the limitations of physical terrain to shape the operational environment. For example, forces may use shortwave transmitters to broadcast messages in areas where mountain ranges prevent line-of-sight frequency modulation (FM) radio broadcasting with messages targeted at a specific segment of the population. Shortwave transmitters (such as those used on EC-130J Commando Solo) may be able to broadcast the messages to reach the populace in the target area. Note: The U.S. military uses the specially configured Commando Solo to conduct information operations to broadcast in amplitude modulation, FM, high-frequency, television, and military communications bands.
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT CHARACTERISICS
1-21. There are certain characteristics of a resistance movement that make U.S. Support favorable. Characteristics of a favorable movement include the following:
Willingness to cooperate with the United States.
Compatible objectives and ideology.
Capable resistance leadership.
WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES
1-22. A genuine willingness to collaborate and cooperate with the United States must exist within the leadership of the indigenous force. It is unrealistic to expect a leader to relinquish control of his forces to the United States. In general, insurgent leaders expect to retain authority and control over their forces while benefiting their cause by collaborating with the United States. Tailored, persuasive messages targeting key leaders and groups may increase their willingness to accept U.S. support.
COMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES AND IDEOLOGY
1-23. Successful movements must have compatible objectives and an ideology that binds their forces together. Organizations bound through some commitment other than common ideology—such as forced conscription or hired mercenaries—typically are only marginally capable over a protracted period. Armed groups may find a common bond in ethnicity, religion, or tribal ties. Elements can use persuasive techniques and messages emphasizing commonalities to unite different groups for a common cause. Once the groups unite, other messages can reinforce unity by building morale, reinforcing organizational cohesion, and emphasizing mutual goals.
CAPABLE RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP
1-24. Resistance movement leaders are cautious of quickly forming new partnerships. In order to understand insurgent leaders, it is critical to understand their motivation and desires. Planners must consider what the United States is requesting and offering in return from the insurgent’s perspective. The best leader is not always the one that is the easiest to work with initially. In fact, an overly accommodating Chapter 1 1-6 TC 18-01 30 November 2010 leader could be a desperate and incapable leader primarily interested in personal gain. Similarly, a seemingly indifferent leader could be an effective leader that is unimpressed with offers of support without an assurance of long-term commitment because of the potential risk involved. The determination of the appropriateness of U.S. support requires an in-depth understanding of the resistance leadership and organization. This level of fidelity normally requires a degree of first-hand observation in order to develop an educated assessment.
1-25. Assessments are important sources of information on the psychological characteristics of leaders and groups. This analysis provides a degree of prediction about the future behavior of these potential partners. With prediction comes a degree of confidence in knowing how potential resistance leaders will conduct themselves in the UW effort. It also provides information on guerrilla leader expectations for their forces in terms of the method of fighting, treatment of civilians, and other key aspects that can have political and legal ramifications for the operation. This information aids the commander or other decision-makers in determining the appropriateness of any support to the movement.
THE CRITICALITY OF THE FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT
1-26. Planning remains limited until leadership validates certain assumptions. If operations proceed without a proper feasibility assessment, the likelihood of unintended consequences is high. To gain an accurate picture, operational personnel need to meet with indigenous personnel who represent the resistance forces. This meeting can take place inside the denied territory, in the United States, or in a third-party nation. Although meeting representatives in the United States or a third-party nation is safer for an assessment team, it also provides a less reliable assessment of potential capabilities. Participation of all components is vital to enable an accurate assessment of potential resistance capabilities. No single ARSOF element can provide a complete picture of the movement necessary for this crucial step in the UW effort.
1-27. The feasibility assessment analyzes the achievability, acceptability, and suitability of a mission. This is an assessment based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) to determine if the necessary means and resources are available to meet mission requirements. It also addresses whether the potential gain or desired effect outweighs or otherwise justifies the potential losses or cost. Lastly, the assessment determines if achieving the desired objectives would accomplish the desired effects.
1-28. The normal areas of concern that make up a feasibility assessment are as follows:
Are there groups that could develop into a viable force with assistance?
Is the United States in contact with or can it make contact with individuals representing the resistance potential in an area?
Are there any capable leaders, whose goals are compatible with U.S. goals who are willing to cooperate with the United States?
Can the United States influence the leaders to remain compliant with U.S. goals?
Are the groups’ tactics and battlefield conduct acceptable by the standards established in Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, and to the U.S. population?
Will the environment geographically and demographically support resistance operations?
Is the enemy effectively in control of the population?
Is the potential gain worth the potential risk? Is this group’s participation politically acceptable to other regional partners?
1-29. All U.S. UW elements are able to assist the commander in answering these questions. They assist with
individual perspectives for developing a particular resistance capability, as well as for an overall feasibility
1-30. Expatriates are a valuable resource, particularly in regions where the culture is largely unfamiliar or alien to a planner’s frame of reference. However, planners should carefully ensure the individual’s claims are valid. An expatriate’s influence in a given country can be inversely proportional to the length of time he has been away from his former homeland. Although there are many reasons an expatriate might exaggerate his influence in a region and attempt to exploit the situation in his favor, he may be legitimately surprised to find his own assessment of his influence to be grossly inaccurate. During normal peacetime conditions, a person can spend years away from a country and expect to maintain their contacts and influence. This period significantly shrinks under the pressures of a harsh regime or occupying force.
1-31. While determining the feasibility of a potential campaign, planning personnel must have clear objectives, a desired end state, and knowledge of exactly what level of support is available and acceptable. Without these specifics, negotiations with potential resistance forces are futile. If planners determine conditions are unfavorable during the assessment, then they need to consider any measures that could transform the current situation into a more favorable one. For example, can the United States—
Persuade a potential resistance group to cease unacceptable tactics or behavior?
Persuade a coalition to accept a specific resistance group’s participation under certain
Degrade the enemy’s control over the population?
Bolster the will of the population to resist?
Achieve desired objectives within the given time constraints?
1-32. SF, Military Information Support (MIS), and CA Soldiers can actively engage their resistance counterparts to encourage adherence to international norms of behavior and law. They can also change attitudes and beliefs about other groups participating in the resistance effort as part of unity and cohesion building.
1-33. Planners need to be careful of attempting to overcome a potential resistance shortcoming by creating surrogate forces that are not indigenous. Historically, the United States has not had success creating and transplanting these types of resistance forces to the operations environment without an existing clandestine infrastructure that connects the local population to the foreign forces.
WAYS THE UNITED STATES CONDUCTS UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-34. The United States conducts two types of UW. The United States executes UW with the anticipation of large-scale U.S. military involvement or without anticipation of large-scale U.S. military involvement.
GENERAL WAR SCENARIOS
1-35. There are two possible goals of large-scale involvement. The goal is either to facilitate the eventual introduction of conventional forces or to divert enemy resources away from other parts of the operational area.
1-36. UW forces can function as effective instruments in the psychological preparation of the population for the introduction of conventional forces. Furthermore, deception and other measures can convince enemy leaders to divert resources away from the main area of effort when it is not necessary to do so. For example, the United States can disseminate messages suggesting guerrilla operations will occur in certain locations, causing enemy leaders to divert their forces away from the actual route of advance to meet a nonexistent threat. Examples of this type of UW effort by the United States include the following:
European and Pacific Theaters (1942–1945).
North Korea (1951–1953).
Cold War Contingency Plans for Eastern Europe (1952–1989).
1-37. During large-scale UW, operations focus largely on military aspects of the conflict because of the eventual introduction of conventional forces. The task is normally to disrupt or degrade enemy military capabilities in order to make them more vulnerable to the pending introduction of conventional invasion forces. The United States can use actions and messages to increase the disruption and degradation of Chapter 1 1-8 TC 18-01 30 November 2010 enemy capabilities by lowering their morale and unit cohesion. This can increase desertion, surrender, and malingering among their ranks. Use of such techniques increases the potential for enemy unit breakdown to the point of rendering them combat-ineffective.
1-38. Resistance forces assume a one-time greater degree of risk in large-scale involvement scenarios by exposing almost their entire infrastructure in exchange for the possibility of success and linkup with friendly coalition forces following an invasion. The ultimate challenge is synchronizing resistance efforts while maintaining a degree of operational security for the invasion.
1-39. If the intent of the UW operation is to develop an area in order to facilitate the entry of an invasion force, the challenge is to ensure that the operations of the resistance complement (rather than inadvertently interfere with or even compromise) those of the invasion forces. If the timing is wrong or the conventional invasion forces fail to liberate the territory and linkup with resistance forces, it is likely that the resistance organization (guerrillas, underground, and auxiliary personnel) will suffer significant losses.
1-40. With a few exceptions, it is relatively simple for U.S. forces to compel an adversary to commit forces to an area away from a possible invasion site. The challenge in this scenario is determining which resistance actions trigger the desirable responses and when to begin those operations to appropriately affect the adversary’s decision cycle. If U.S. forces do not coordinate these operations with the invasion force or time the operations incorrectly, they can cause significant negative consequences.
1-41. In general, the United States uses limited-involvement operations to pressure an adversary. Examples of this type of UW effort by the United States include the following:
The Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia–1950s).
North Vietnam (1961–1964).
1-42. During limited-involvement missions, the overall operation takes place in the absence of overt or eventual hostilities from the sponsor. Such operations take on a strategic and sensitive political aspect. Typically, the United States limits its direct involvement, which mitigates the risks of unintended consequences or premature escalation of the conflict. During limited-involvement operations, the manner in which forces operate significantly differs from that of large-scale involvement scenarios. Without the benefit of a conventional invasion force, the resistance forces must limit overt exposure of their forces and supporting infrastructure in order to sustain operations over a protracted period. Forces must conduct operations in a manner that accounts for the enemy’s response and retaliation.
1-43. If retaliation occurs, the resistance can exploit the negative consequences to garner more sympathy and support from the population by emphasizing the sacrifices and hardship the resistance is enduring on behalf of “the people.” If retaliation is ineffective or does not occur, the resistance can use this as proof of its ability to wage effect combat against the enemy. In addition, the resistance can portray the inability or reluctance of the enemy to retaliate as a weakness, which will demoralize enemy forces and instill a belief in their eventual defeat.
THE SEVEN PHASES OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-44. The seven-phase UW framework is a conceptual construct that aids in planning (Figure 1-3). It depicts the normal phases of a UW operation. Personnel should not confuse the seven phases of UW with the phases of development through which friendly resistance forces progress. It is important for planners to recognize when factors, such as time, compress or change the normal progression of the seven phases. In addition, operational elements may only support a portion of the overall campaign and therefore may miss some of the seven phases. However, all operational elements should understand how their individual efforts fit into the overall campaign. Chapter 3 contains more information on the seven phases of UW.
ELEMENTS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-45. The operational requirements for conducting and supporting UW present some significant challenges when compared to other types of special and conventional operations. UW efforts are normally of long duration and primarily occur in denied areas. These conditions require participating forces to have the capability of operating in a truly decentralized manner without the benefit of well-established LOCs. These factors make many of the existing techniques for command and control (C2) and logistics inappropriate.
SPECIAL FORCES IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-46. Whereas other special operations and governmental organizations support UW, SF are the only unit specifically designed to conduct UW. Unique SF capabilities include—
Infiltrating denied territory and linking up with resistance forces. Chapter 1
1-10 TC 18-01 30 November 2010
Training and advising the guerrilla or underground forces part of a resistance.
Coordinating and synchronizing the various resistance command elements with U.S. efforts.
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-47. U.S. forces can use MISO as part of ARSOF capabilities or in conjunction with other USG capabilities to reduce the need for military force. When military force is necessary, Soldiers conduct MISO to multiply the effects of the operations. Specifically, MIS elements—
Determine key psychological factors in the operational environment.
Provide training and advisory assistance to insurgent leaders and units on the development, organization, and employment of resistance information capabilities.
Identify actions with psychological effects that can create, change, or reinforce desired behaviors in identified target groups or individuals.
Shape popular perceptions to support UW objectives.
Counter enemy misinformation and disinformation that can undermine the UW mission.
CIVIL AFFAIRS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-48. CA personnel augment the SF headquarters (HQ) by providing expertise in civil-military operations (CMO). Although CMO plays a small role in resistance operations, planning CMO early in the campaign is critical. CMO efforts can play a significant role in—
Mitigating the suffering of the population during resistance operations through humanitarian assistance (HA) efforts. (Forces must conduct CMO and HA efforts in a manner that does not link the population to the resistance effort, thereby bringing the retaliation of adversary forces.)
Planning mobilization of popular support to the UW campaign.
Analyzing impacts of resistance on indigenous populations and institutions and centers of gravity through CA inputs to intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE).
Providing the supported commander with critical elements of civil information to improve situational awareness and understanding within the operational environment.
Assisting in stabilization post conflict.
Assisting in the demobilization and transition of former resistance forces post conflict. Note: FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, contains additional information on CA support to UW.
OTHER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
1-49. Because of the military and political nature of UW, the U.S. interagency involvement is critical to achieving a whole-of-government approach and long-term success. The full integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational communities is necessary at various stages of an unconventional conflict.
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PREFACE ………………………………………………………….. iv
Chapter 1 OVERVIEW …………………………………… 1-1
Introduction to Unconventional Warfare ……………………………… 1-1
The Role of Unconventional Warfare in United States National Strategy……. 1-2
Feasibility for United States Sponsorship ……………….. 1-3
Physical and Human Environmental Conditions ………………… 1-3
Resistance Movement Characteristics …………………………………. 1-5
The Criticality of the Feasibility Assessment ………………….. 1-6
Ways the United States Conducts Unconventional Warfare ……………… 1-7
The Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare …………………………… 1-8
Elements in Unconventional Warfare ………………………………. 1-9
Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF RESISTANCE AND INSURGENCY ………… 2-1
Why Populations Resist ……………………… 2-1
Dynamics of Successful Insurgencies ………………………….. 2-3
The Components of an Insurgency …………………… 2-8
Additional Elements of an Insurgency …………………… 2-12
Infrastructure of a Resistance Movement or Insurgency ……. 2-13
Organization of Medical Support Within the Area Complex ….. 2-17
Insurgent Support Networks ……………………….. 2-18 Contents
Chapter 3 CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT …………………. 3-1
Planning for Unconventional Warfare ………………….. 3-1
Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare ……………………. 3-2
Civil Affairs Support to the Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare ….. 3-8
Logistics Considerations ……………………………………….. 3-9
Supply Considerations ………………………………………… 3-10
Command and Control ……………………………………………….. 3-13
Legal Principles ………………………………………………… 3-15
Appendix A AREA STUDY ……………………………………………………… A-1
Appendix B SPECIAL FORCES AREA ASSESSMENT ……………. B-1
Appendix C SAMPLE TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION FOR RESISTANCE FORCES …………………………….. C-1
Appendix D SPECIAL FORCES CACHING……………………………… D-1
GLOSSARY …………………………………………………… Glossary-1
REFERENCES ……………………………………………… References-1
INDEX …………………….. Index-1
Figure 1-1. Unconventional warfare terminology …………………… 1-2
Figure 1-2. Support for an insurgency ………………………………… 1-4
Figure 1-3. Phases of unconventional warfare ……………………… 1-9
Figure 2-1. Resistance terminology …………………………. 2-2
Figure 2-2. Structure of an insurgency or resistance movement …. 2-4
Figure 2-3. Operational cell ……………………………. 2-9
Figure 2-4. Intelligence cell ……………………………… 2-9
Figure 2-5. Parallel cells …………………………….. 2-10
Figure 2-6. Auxiliary cell ……………………… 2-11
Figure 2-7. Cells in series ………………………………. 2-11
Figure 2-8. Resistance structure with government-in-exile …….. 2-13
Figure 2-9. Area complex ……………………………. 2-14
Figure 2-10. Permanent base security ………………….. 2-15
Figure 3-1. Unconventional warfare elements …………… 3-2
Figure A-1. Area study outline format ……………………. A-1
Figure B-1. Sample principal assessment …………………….. B-1 Contents
Figure C-1. Sample master training plan for 30-day leadership course ……. C-1
Figure C-2. Sample master training plan for 10-day leadership course …….. C-2
Figure C-3. Data card—personnel and training record …………….. C-4
Table D-1. Buoyancy chart …………………… D-16